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THE FROZEN EMBRYO: SCHOLARLY THEORIES, CASE
LAW, AND PROPOSED STATE REGULATION
Shirley Darby Howell*
INTRODUCTION
Fertility experts have been able to create human embryos outside the
body since the 1970s. However, both moral and legal questions still per-
sist regarding the use of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). Using IVF to assist
individuals and couples having trouble procreating would be seemingly
positive, but the procedure has resulted in serious unintended consequenc-
es that continue to trouble theologians, physicians, and the courts. The
ongoing legal debate focuses on two principal questions: (1) whether a
frozen embryo should be regarded as a person, property, or something else
and, (2) how to best resolve disputes between gamete donors concerning
disposition of surplus frozen embryos.
State legislators have taken widely divergent and often constitutional-
ly suspect positions on both of these questions. Some state legislatures
have avoided potential political repercussions by refusing to address these
troubling questions and, instead, have deferred to the courts.
Because of the largely unresolved issues surrounding frozen embry-
os, preeminent legal scholars have written extensively in an effort to pro-
vide guidance to decision makers. The theories range from simple con-
tract to complex constitutional analyses. In this Article, I will present the
strengths and weaknesses of each of these theories. After an analysis of
these theories, I will propose model legislation that would provide gamete
donors with human dignity and legal certainty.
Section I of this article discusses the in vitro fertilization process, in-
cluding the unintended consequences and who is responsible for those
consequences. Section II explores the controversy over the proper legal
status of the frozen embryo. Section III presents scholarly approaches to
dispute resolution that include the Robertson Contract Theory, the Cole-
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man Contemporaneous Consent Approach, the Feminist Position, and the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Right to Procreate and the Right to
Not Procreate. Section IV focuses upon Israel's controversial Nahmani
case, in which Israel's divided Supreme Court embraced a solution to em-
bryo disputes. In Section V, I propose legislation to enhance the dignity of
gamete donors and to resolve the issue of the disposition of abandoned
embryos.
SECTION I
A. The In Vitro Fertilization Process
With the birth in 1987 of the first baby conceived outside a woman's
body,' science gave childless couples around the world a new hope for
parenthood.' For the first time, fertility experts could combine an ovum
and sperm in a petri dish and create an embryo or pre-embryo that might
become a "test tube" baby.' Physicians labeled the revolutionary proce-
dure in vitro fertilization ("IVF").4
To initiate an IVF procedure, a physician will administer hormonal
treatments to the female gamete donor in order to stimulate her ovaries to
produce an abnormally large number of eggs.' During the patient's next
ovulation cycle, the physician will use one of two methods to harvest the
eggs.6 Through a minimally invasive procedure, the physician may re-
move the eggs by making a few small incisions in the patient's abdomen
and extracting them, or may perform a vaginal aspiration using a suction-
ing needle.' Neither method is foolproof or without its risks to the health
of the patient.' Because the patient faces both significant pain and a level
of risk during each egg extraction, most elect to have more eggs extracted
than they are likely to implant should issues arise with those eggs being
1. Clifton Perry & Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 463, 463 n.1 (1992).
2. Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes Over the Fate of
Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1998) (explaining that Americans spend over a billion
dollars a year on fertility treatments).
3. See, Olivia Lin, Rehabilitating Bioethics: Recontexualizing In Vitro Fertilization Outside Contractual
Autonomy, 54 DUKE L.J. 485, 489 (2004) (explaining that while the word "preembryo" may be awkward,
the description is correct because the collection of cells has not undergone sufficient differentiation to form
what is considered an embryo); cf Perry, supra note 1.
4. Perry, supra note 1, at 463.
5. Id. at 467.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Joseph G. Schenker, Prevention and Treatment of Ovarian Hyperstimulation, 8 HUMAN REPROD
653 (1993).
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implanted or they have a future desire for another baby via IVF.9
When the physician has harvested the eggs, she will attempt to ferti-
lize them with the semen the patient has selected."o If fertilization is suc-
cessful, the physician will implant two or three embryos in the first IVF
cycle." Any surplus embryos will be frozen for possible implantation in
the future.12
B. Unintended Consequences
The IVF procedure has successfully enabled thousands of infertile
heterosexual couples, gay couples, and single individuals to become par-
ents. The IVF process, however, can have unexpected negative conse-
quences. Today, there are over 500,000 frozen embryos stored in fertility
clinics in the United States alone." Some fertility clinics have so many
embryos that they pay commercial storage firms to warehouse them indef-
initely.'4
C. Who Is Responsible?
Three distinct groups of gamete donors are responsible for the accu-
mulation of this astounding number of frozen embryos. The first and per-
haps most interesting group of gamete donors develop an intense familial
affection for their frozen embryos, thinking of them as frozen children.
Fertility clinicians report that some of these donors occasionally stop by to
"check on" their embryos." One such donor, who can neither implant her
surplus embryos nor bear to destroy them, states, "[m]aybe when I die,
they'll just bury my embryos with me."" These donors continue to pay
storage fees while they continue to search for moral answers to their di-
lemma."
A second group of gamete donors who contributes to the proliferation
9. Joshua S. Vinciguerra, Showing "Special Respect" - Permitting the Gestation ofAbandoned Preembry-
os, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 399, 403 (1999) (citing Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 170 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997)).
10. Perry, supra note 1, at 467.
11. Id. at 468 n40.
12. Id.
13. Liza Mundy, Souls on Ice: America's Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research,
MOTHER JONES (Jun. 30, 2006), at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-
embryo-glut-and-wasted-promise-stem-cell-research.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Perry, supra note 1, at 494.
17. Mundy, supra note 13.
18. Contra Id
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of stored frozen embryos are those who divorce without having a clear
plan for either distribution or destruction of their frozen embryos. 9 in
many of these cases, one party wants to either implant the embryos or do-
nate them to another infertile couple for implantation.20 The other party,
no longer wanting a child, wants to destroy the frozen embryos.2 1 These
donors must leave their embryos in storage until they either reach a meet-
ing of the minds or a court decides the fate of the embryos.2 2
The third and most problematic group abandons its frozen embryos
by leaving them in storage.23 While there are no formal studies indicating
how many embryos have been abandoned, anecdotal evidence suggests
that thousands of embryos will never be claimed.24 One physician has re-
ported that he, alone, has "tons" of embryos that have been abandoned.2 5
SECTION II
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FROZEN EMBRYO: PERSON,
PROPERTY, OR AN "ENTITY" DESERVING SPECIAL RESPECT
Bioethicists, legal commentators, religious philosophers, and judges
all wrestle with how to deal with issues pertaining to frozen embryos.2 6
Each group approaches the analysis from a different perspective. Not sur-
prisingly, legal commentators begin the analysis by attempting to assign a
legal status to frozen embryos.27 Jurists and legal scholars thus far have
concluded that frozen embryos must fall into one of three categories: (1)
human life at its earliest early stage; (2) property; or (3) an entity occupy-
ing an interim status.28
19. Cf Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 591-92 (Tenn. 1992).
20. Id. at 589.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 592.
23. Mundy, supra note 13.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Angela K. Upchurch, Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 CONN. L. REv. 2107,
2109 (2007).
27. Id. at 2117.
28. Diane K. Yang, What's Mine is Mine, but What's Yours Should Also be Mine: An Analysis of State
Statutes That Mandate the Implantation ofFrozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 587, 592 (2002).
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A. The Frozen Embryo as Early Life
1. Proponents of the Position
Professors Robert P. George 29 and Christopher Tollefsen" argue in
their book, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, that the frozen embryo is
nothing less than human life, albeit at its earliest stage."' According to
George and Tollefsen, "[a] human embryo is not something different in
kind from a human being, like a rock, or a potato, or a rhinoceros. A hu-
man embryo is a whole living member of the species Homo sapiens in the
earliest stage of his or her natural development."3 2 George and Tollefsen
seek to make their point with a story of the actions of first responders dur-
ing Hurricane Katrina." According to George and Tollefsen, first re-
sponders evacuating a flooded New Orleans hospital retrieved a tank of ni-
trous oxide that contained over 1,400 frozen embryos.34 Subsequently, a
child, aptly named Noah, was born as a result of the implantation of one of
the rescued frozen embryos." They contend that but for the humane ac-
tions of the police, "the toll of Katrina would have been fourteen hundred
human beings higher than it already was."36
The views of George and Tollefsen largely mirror those of the Ro-
man Catholic Church." The Vatican's 1987 Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of Procreation articulates the
Church's position that the embryo is fully human." The IVF regulations
of Italy reflect the Vatican's position. Italian law permits the harvesting of
no more than three eggs per IVF cycle.39 The three eggs must be implant-
29. Robert P. George is a member of the President's Council on Bioethics and is a Professor of Jurispru-
dence and also Director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton
University. He is the author of Making Men Moral, In Defense of Natural Law, and The Clash of Ortho-
doxies.
30. Christopher Tollefsen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of
South Carolina, and is Director of U.S.C.'s Graduate Program in Philosophy.
31. ROBERT GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFsEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE 50 (2008).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1-2.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Compare Robert George & Christopher Tollefsen, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE (2008), with
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the
Dignity of Procreation, available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rccon cfaithdoc
19870222 respect-for-human-life en.html
38. Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, supra note 37.
39. George, supra note 31, at 216.
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ed in the mother.40
Thus far, only two American states, both having large Catholic popu-
lations,41 have adopted the moral position that a frozen embryo is fully
human. Both Louisiana and New Mexico have severely restricted the use
of IVF procedures. 42 Louisiana's pertinent IVF statutes provide that an in
vitro fertilized human ovum is both a "juridical person" 43 and a "biological
human being."44 New Mexico implicitly grants a human embryo the status
of human being by mandating that all in vitro fertilized ova be implanted
in a human female recipient.45
2. Legal Impediments to the Enforceability of "Embryos as Early
Life" Position
Louisiana's and New Mexico's statutes require that human embryos
either be implanted or stored until they are adopted. 46 At first blush, the
statutes seem to be a feasible means to treat frozen embryos as human life.
Upon closer analysis, however, the statutes present insurmountable consti-
tutional and practical problems.
Roe v. Wade and its progeny hold that a woman has a privacy interest
in her own bodily integrity that includes the right to abort her non-viable
fetus.47 Consequently, if an IVF female gamete donor subsequently refus-
es implantation, the state cannot compel her to go forward with the proce-
dure. If a woman reluctantly consented to implantation, she could still
abort the fetus; thereby frustrating the purpose of the Louisiana and New
Mexico statutes. 48
The Louisiana statute provides that gamete donors may renounce
their parental rights "by notarial act" so that the embryos can be placed for
adoption.4 9 What the Louisiana legislature failed to contemplate is the
possibility that (1) the gamete donors will abandon the embryo(s); or, (2)
40. Id
41. See The Largest Catholic Communities, ADHERENTS.COM: NATIONAL & WORLD RELIGION
STATISTICS, at www.adherents.com/largecom/com romcath.html. (last visited August 25, 2011) (listing
New Mexico and Louisiana among the top ten states for Catholic Church membership. Mora County, New
Mexico has a 94.86% Catholic population, and St. James County, Louisiana is 84.18% Catholic).
42. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:125, 9:126 (2011); See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(D) (2012).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125 (2011).
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (2011).
45. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(D) (2012).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-l (D) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (2011).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 727 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992).
48. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (noting that a woman has a
right to a pre-viability abortion).
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (1986).
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that no one will adopt the embryo(s). On a practical level, either situation
may result in fertility clinics having to store countless embryos indefinite-
ly. Predictably, fertility clinics will pass on these "legislative" costs to in-
fertile patients, causing the already expensive procedure to become even
more expensive.
Professor Diane K. Yang points out that several forms of popular
contraceptives prevent pregnancy by preventing embryos that have formed
inside a woman's body from attaching to the uterus. 0 These embryos
flush naturally from the woman's system during her menstrual cycle."
"Such [natural] occurrences are not contemplated as a loss of life, but ra-
ther a loss of genetic cells."52 If a woman can use a contraceptive to pre-
vent embryos within her body from progressing into a pregnancy, it is il-
logical to say she must treat the same embryos as protected human life
when they are frozen in nitrous oxide. The Louisiana and New Mexico
statutes create this bizarre conundrum.
Somewhat remarkably, neither the Louisiana nor the New Mexico
statutes have been challenged. Both are constitutionally weak and unen-
forceable as a practical matter. Respected scholars who favor treating fro-
zen embryos as human beings are also openly and unapologetically op-
posed to abortion on religious and moral grounds." Nonetheless, while
Roe v. Wade is the settled law of the land, their attempts to classify frozen
embryos as human life are unworkable.
B. Frozen Embryos as Property
To treat the frozen embryo as mere property is to view it as chattel, a
movable piece of personal property. The owners of this embryonic prop-
erty would enjoy the same rights in it as they would in a sofa, automobile,
or beach chair. The owners could sell the embryos, throw them away, or
trade them for something else. A third party could convert the embryos
and become liable for the fair market value of the embryo.
The court in York v. Jones applied the property approach.54 Through
an IVF procedure, six eggs were harvested from Mrs. York for future im-
plantation." When the Yorks moved to California, they requested that the
50. Yang, supra note 28, at 595-96.
5 1. Id.
52. Id.
53. Cf Olga Batsedis, Embryo Adoption A Science Fiction or an Alternative to Traditional Adoption?, 41
FAM. CT. REV. 565, 571 (2003).
54. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989).
55. Id. at 424.
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clinic transfer one pre-zygote to California.56 The clinic refused, and the
Yorks sued. 7 The district court held that the clinic acted as bailee of the
property and was under a legal duty to return it to the rightful owners.ss
Katheleen R. Guzman, in Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted
Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, makes the argument that while
one might appropriately consider the frozen embryo as mere property, do-
ing so leads to unnecessarily awkward, formal results:"
If the embryo is property, however, the legal owners lay their
claim through a combination of labor and occupation theories-
those who first expend capital or effort to produce the good have
rights paramount to all others claiming an interest therein. Is-
sues would focus not on the embryo but on others' status there-
to-who has paramount rights relative to whom. The question
involves possession and title issues such as bailments, equitable
division of property, and concurrent ownership. The embryo's
genetic contributors, the institution in which it was stored, or its
intended recipients could assert control over the property and
could own either or both legal and equitable title to the embryo
depending on the theory of ownership proffered. The owner
could then convey the property through donative transfer or sale
regulated by basic gift, contract, and code principles. By con-
trast, if the embryo is a person, the attempted transfer would
analogize to slavery or the chattelization of human life. In short,
if a person, the embryo can own property. If property, the em-
bryo can be owned.60
C. The Frozen Embryo as an Entity Deserving Respect
The majority of commentators and courts subscribe to or at least pay
lip service to a conceptual middle ground between viewing the frozen em-
bryo as human and viewing the frozen embryo as mere property.6 Most
contend that the frozen embryo is an entity "entitle[d] . . . to special re-
spect" because it represents potential life.62 It is difficult, however, to de-
fine respect in this context.
5 6. Id.
5 7. Id.
58. Id. at 425.
59. See Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of
Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997).
60. Id.
61. Id.; See also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
62. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. at 597; See also Upchurch, supra note 22, at 2122.
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One might suppose that since a frozen embryo is an entity deserving
of respect that every court would decide disputes over frozen embryos in
favor of the party wanting to implant the embryo. On the contrary, courts
have sided with the party who favored destroying the embryos in every
case decided in the United States thus far.63 Most courts have opined that
the gamete donor who does not wish to implant should ordinarily prevail
in a dispute with the other gamete donor.'
One can only wonder if the oft used term "entity deserving special re-
spect" should be shortened simply to "entity." Professor Angela Upchurch
pointedly questions the intellectual honesty of referring to frozen embryos
as an entity deserving of "special respect."" She posits that a far more ac-
curate assessment would be to call them an entity deserving of "special re-
sistance," since courts routinely decide in favor of their destruction.6 6
Nonetheless, the term persists, if as nothing more than a comfort for
Americans who are unwilling to designate frozen embryos as property.
SECTION III
SCHOLARLY THEORIES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Preeminent legal scholars disagree sharply over the proper approach
for deciding disputes between gamete donors regarding the fate of their
unused frozen embryos. Professor John Robertson contends that gamete
donors who voluntarily and advisedly enter into a contract prior to IVF re-
garding the disposition of unused embryos should be able to rely upon the
enforcement of the agreement.67 Professor Carl H. Coleman maintains that
contracts concerning family relationships violate public policy and are un-
enforceable upon a change of mind by either party.68
Other legal scholars dismiss arguments based on contract principles
and predicate their arguments on constitutional theories. Kimberly Berg
cites Supreme Court cases relating to contraception and abortion that she
maintains create a constitutional right not to procreate.6 9 Professor Glenn
Cohen argues that contraception and abortion cases do not necessarily ap-
63. Upchurch, supra note 26, at 2128.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2133.
66. Id
67. Yang, supra note 28, at 597-98.
68. Id. at 598-99.
69. Kimberly Berg, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 528
(2006).
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ply to disputes over frozen embryos."o He also contends that if a right not
to procreate exists, the right can be "unbundled" into three distinct subsec-
tions of parenthood: the right not to be a gestational parent; the right not to
be a genetic parent; and the right not to be a legal parent." Cohen asserts
that to compel a person to become a genetic parent under some circum-
stances is constitutionally permissible.72
Professor Judith F. Daar argues that the constitutional right to procre-
ate should be viewed as superior to any right not to procreate when one
gamete donor wants to implant the frozen embryos and the other wants to
destroy them. Professor Daar further cites Supreme Court reproductive
jurisdiction to support an award of embryos to the party who wants to do-
nate the embryos to a childless couple so long as the unwilling partner is
not burdened with legal responsibility toward the child.74
Feminist scholars, including Professor Daar, advocate that the female
gamete donor should have exclusive control over her frozen embryos for
the same period of time that a pregnant woman would have the right to
choose an abortion.7 ' These scholars view the female's interest in the em-
bryos as superior to that of the male because of the greater physical in-
vestment that the IVF procedure requires of the female.
In subsections A-E below, I set out the salient points of each theory.
A. The Robertson Contract Theory
In his article, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, Professor John Robertson takes a classic contract approach to
resolving disputes between gamete donors. Robertson maintains that
parties who "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" enter into a con-
tract concerning the ultimate disposition of their surplus embryos must be
bound by their agreements.
One of Professor Robertson's most persuasive arguments for a con-
tract model centers upon the concept of reliance." To illustrate his point,
70. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1148 (2008).
71. Id at 1139-40.
72. See id. at l155.
73. Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: Developing an
Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 466 (1999).
74. Id. at 460.
75. See id. at 466-69.
76. Id. at 460-62.
77. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition ofFrozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989
(2001).
78. Id. at 1024-25.
79. Robertson, supra note 77, at 1001.
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suppose that Tom and Mary must resort to IVF to have genetic children. 0
They agree prior to undertaking IVF that any embryos they do not choose
to implant would be donated to an infertile couple for implantation."' As a
result of successful IVF treatment, Tom and Mary have one daughter.82
Their marriage failed thereafter and the parties petitioned for divorce." In
her petition, Mary seeks to have the remaining frozen embryos awarded
solely to her.84 If the court awards the five surplus embryos to Mary, she
will destroy them because she does not want her daughter to have siblings
that she will never know." Tom insists that the prior agreement to donate
the embryos should control.86
Professor Robertson would argue that Tom's reliance upon his
agreement must be vindicated for a number of valid reasons. Tom's will-
ingness to undertake IVF may have been integrally intertwined with
Mary's promise that surplus embryos would be donated to a childless cou-
ple." Tom might not have been willing to proceed with IVF but for the
agreement." He may have had religious objections to the destruction of
their embryos." He may also have sought to protect against having more
children with Mary if they divorced.90 If Tom's contract is not enforced,
all of his expectations will be nullified.9' Professor Robertson further ar-
gues that if courts will not enforce agreements such as that between Tom
and Mary, parties entering into the IVF process can have no certainty
about their reproductive future.92
Professor Robertson also argues that the best way for infertile couples
to have procreative autonomy is to permit them to enter binding contracts
prior to beginning IVF treatments.93 If such contracts are enforced, the
parties, themselves, have directed their future as parents.94 If such con-
80. See generally J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 2001) (giving an example of a case similar to the
hypothetical case).
81. See generally id. at 710 (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
82. See generally id. (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
83. See generally id. (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
84. See generally id. (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
85. See generally id. at 710 (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
86. See generally id. at 710-11 (giving an example of a case similar to the hypothetical case).
87. Robertson, supra note 77, at 1031.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1024 n.159.
90. Cf id. at 1031 (noting at the time of fertilization, a husband may wish the embryos be destroyed if the
couple separates).
91. Cf id. (explaining that a party may be less likely to participate in IVF if their pre-IVF contracts are
subject to later review).
92. Robertson, supra note 77, at 1031.
93. Id. at 1039-40.
94. Id. at 1038-39.
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tracts are not enforced, decisions about the procreative future of gamete
donors will be made by strangers, specifically the courts.95
Professor Robertson acknowledges the emotional sensitivity of the is-
sues surrounding the fate of surplus embryos.96 Professor Robertson dis-
cusses at some length the reasons why a person might have a change of
mind.97 Ultimately, however, Professor Robertson concludes that contract
enforcement is the only method that vindicates the reliance interests of
both parties and eliminates, in so far as possible, the intervention of the
court system into the highly personal issue of procreative liberty." If a
dispute arises between gamete donors who have executed a pre-IVF con-
tract and a Robertson contract model is imposed, the only justiciable issue
will be the interpretation of the contract. 99
Professor Robertson's contract model has garnered the approval of
the medical community and many courts. An overview of cases support-
ing Robertson's contract theory is set out below:
1. Davis v. Davis
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis undertook IVF during their mar-
riage.'" When they subsequently filed for divorce, they disagreed over the
disposition of their remaining frozen embryos."o' Mr. and Mrs. Davis had
made no written agreement prior to the IVF procedure concerning disposi-
tion of their embryos should they file for divorce.102
The Tennessee Supreme Court's analysis contained an important ref-
erence to pre-IVF contractual agreements:
We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding dis-
position of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contin-
gencies (such as the death of one or more of the parties, divorce,
financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) should be
presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progeni-
tors. This conclusion is in keeping with the proposition that the
progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to
the preembryos, retain decision-making authority as to their dis-
95. Id. at 1039-40.
96. Id. at 1019-21.
97. Id. at 1016-25.
98. Id. at 1041-44.
99. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach
to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REv. 55, 75-76 (1999).
100. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992).
101. Id. at 592.
102. Id. at 590.
418
THE FROZEN EMBRYO
position.103
2. Kass v. Kass
In March 1990, the Kasses began the IVF process.'" After two un-
successful pregnancies, the Kasses executed an informed consent form that
was provided by the hospital."os A short time later the Kasses separated
and subsequently disagreed on the disposition of the remaining embryos.106
In deciding custody of the embryos, the court stated the following regard-
ing IVF agreements:
Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding
disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed
valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.
Indeed, parties should be encouraged in advance, before em-
barking on IVF and cryopreservation, to think through possible
contingencies and carefully specify their wishes in writing. Ex-
plicit agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions.
They are all the more necessary and desirable in personal mat-
ters of reproductive choice, where the intangible costs of any lit-
igation are simply incalculable. Advance directives, subject to
mutual change of mind that must be jointly expressed, both min-
imize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by
reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the
first instance a quintessentially personal, private decision. 1o
3. J.B. v. M.B.
Before undertaking in vitro fertilization in March 1995, the Cooper
Center gave J.B. and M.B. a consent form with an attached agreement for
their signatures. The agreement stated in relevant part: "I, J.B. (patient),
and M.B. (partner), agree that all control, direction, and ownership of our
tissues will be relinquished to the IVF Program under the following cir-
cumstances: 1. A dissolution of our marriage by court order, unless the
court specifies who takes control and direction of the tissues." 0 8
After going through IVF, the couple gave birth to a daughter.' 9 Soon
103. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
104. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175-76 (N.Y. 1998).
105. Id. at 175-76.
106. Id. at 177.
107. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
108. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
109. Id at 710.
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after, the couple divorced and were unable to agree on the disposition of
the embryos."o In deciding the fate of the embryos, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated:
We find no need for a remand to determine the parties' inten-
tions at the time of the in vitro fertilization process. Assuming
that it would be possible to enter into a valid agreement at that
time irrevocably deciding the disposition of preembryos in cir-
cumstances such as we have here, a formal, unambiguous me-
morialization of the parties' intentions would be required to con-
firm their joint determination. The parties do not contest the
lack of such a writing. We hold, therefore, that J.B. and M.B.
never entered into a separate binding contract providing for the
disposition of the cryopreserved preembryos now in the posses-
sion of the Cooper Center."'
Professor Robertson's model of pre-IVF contracts, however, is not
what the courts have been encountering." 2 The contracts have consistently
been no more than "Informed Consent" documents provided to the gamete
donors by the fertility clinics."'
A number of courts have enforced the terms of the fertility clinic's
"Informed Consent" documents as though they also created a binding
agreement between the gamete donors.114 A close analysis of the informed
consent scenario, however, casts serious doubt upon the propriety of such
an assumption. First, the clinic drafts all the documents and presents every
couple the same forms for their signature."' These documents typically
contain between twelve to twenty pages of single-spaced material relating
both to the nature and risks involved in the IVF procedure and the disposi-
tion of unused pre-embryos."' The parties must either choose from the
clinic's list of dispositional elections or write in their own more specific
choices."' Fertility clinics require the patient and her partner to indicate
their preferences for disposal of unused embryos as a pre-condition of the
clinic going forward with IVF."
110. Id.
111. Id. at 714.
112. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One's Mind, 12 DUKE J. CoMP. &
INT'L L. 75, 81 (2002).
113. Id.
114. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
115. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id Since the gamete donors are free to add their own terms regarding disposition of surplus
preembryos, the contracts are not contracts of adhesion subject to attack as unconscionable.
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Since the clinic initiates the contract process, logic dictates that they
do so to protect themselves in the event of a dispute with the potential
gamete donors. The gamete donors enter the contract in order to obtain
IVF services and to protect themselves from disputes with the clinic. It is
beyond cavil that the clinic and the gamete donors create a classic bilateral
contract. There is, however, no language in the informed consent docu-
ments in which the gamete donors make express promises to each other
regarding future disposition of preembryos." 9 To the contrary, the typical
informed consent document expressly provides that the clinic will obey a
court order with respect to disposition of the preembryos.'20 By way of a
somewhat crude analogy, I argue that the informed consent agreement, in-
sofar as it concerns the storage of future preembryos, creates little more
than a bailment for hire between the clinic and the gamete donors. For the
gamete donors to create a binding express contract with each other, they
must make express promises to each other.
The 1998 Kass case from New York illustrates some of the problems
inherent in enforcing a fertility clinic's forms in disputes between husband
and wife.12' The Kasses executed several lengthy informed consent docu-
ments with the clinic that provided, inter alia:
1. We consent to the retrieval of as many eggs as medically de-
termined by our IVF physician. If more eggs are retrieved than
can be transferred during this IVF cycle, we direct the IVF Pro-
gram to take the following action. ... 122
[2.] We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes ... will not be
released from storage . . . without the written consent of both of
us, consistent with the policies of the IVF Program and applica-
ble law.123
[3.] In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy
or are unable to make a decision regarding . .. our stored ...
pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for .. . disposition of
our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF Program [that] [o]ur frozen
pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program ... for ap-
119. Cf Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77 (giving an example of an agreement one couple had with the IVF clin-
ic, with no language making an agreement between the couple).
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id. at 176.
123. Id.
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proved research investigation as determined by the IVF Pro-
gram.124
[4.] In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership
of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property set-
tlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.125
The couple was unsuccessful in their initial IVF attempts at concep-
tion. 12 The Kass marriage subsequently failed and the parties instituted
divorce proceedings.127 The wife petitioned the court to award her the fro-
zen preembryos for future implantation, relying upon provision (4)
above.128 (Evidence suggested that implantation of the preembryos would
represent the wife's last chance to become a genetic parent, though the
wife did not expressly raise that and the court did not consider it.) The
husband argued that the preembryos should be donated for research, rely-
ing upon provision (3) above. 129 The trial court disregarded both contract
claims and awarded the embryos to the wife, reasoning that the wife
should have exclusive decisional rights over a non-viable fetus under Roe
v. Wade and its progeny.'30 The Appellate Division dismissed the trial
court's reliance upon Roe v. Wade and reversed, finding the informed con-
sent enforceable between the husband and wife.' 3' The New York Court
of Appeals (the highest court in New York) affirmed the Appellate Divi-
sion, concluding that "[a]greements between .. . gamete donors ... should
generally be presumed valid and binding and enforced in any dispute be-
tween them." 32 The court ignored the fact that the informed consent doc-
ument contained no provision creating a contract between the husband and
wife, perhaps on the theory that the couple had waived the issue by failing
to raise it.13 In a tortured parsing of facts, the court found that the twenty-
two page, single-spaced form unambiguously expressed the intent of the
parties despite the conflict between provisions (3) and (4).134 The Court
124. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added).
125. Id at 176.
126. Id. at 175-76.
127. Id. at 177.
128. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (App. Div. 1997).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 599.
132. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
133. See generally Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
134. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 567-69.
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awarded the preembryos to the husband, who would thereafter donate
them to the clinic for scientific research.135
In the 2001 New Jersey case of J.B. v. MB., based upon provisions
contained in a fertility clinic's informed consent documents that were sub-
stantially similar to those in Kass,"' one might have predicted a result like
the one in Kass. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to en-
force the terms contained in the informed consent documents and estab-
lished a very different rule."'
The parties in J.B. v. MB. had signed the clinic's consent forms, in-
dicating that upon dissolution of their marriage any surplus frozen pre-
embryos would become the property of the clinic unless a court made an
alternate disposition."' The New Jersey court found that the form did not
manifest "a clear intent by J.B. and M.B. regarding the disposition of the
pre-embryos."'39 The Court then set out what it called "the better rule."l40
The Court held that unambiguous dispositional agreements would be en-
forced, "subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembry-
os."l41 I discuss the public policy concerns underlying New Jersey's rule
in Part B below. For now, it suffices to say that such a rule would appear
to render dispositional agreements entered at the time of IVF completely
illusory under ordinary contract principles. For purposes of illustration,
suppose that John and Mary, both contract attorneys, voluntarily and in
good faith drafted and executed a contract separate from the informed con-
sent documents providing that in the event of their divorce that any surplus
preembryos would be destroyed. Under the New Jersey rule, either party
could subsequently change his or her mind and render their contract void
at will.142
While a strict contract theory validates the right of competent adults
to make advance decisions concerning their reproductive lives, it leaves
something to be desired when one party to the contract loses his or her last
chance to become a genetic parent if the preembryos are not implanted.
This scenario is discussed in Section C below.
135. Id. at 569.
136. Cf J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709-10 (N.J. 2001), and Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77.
137. JB. v. MB., 783 A.2d at 719.
138. Id. at 713.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 719.
141. Id.
142. lB. v. MB., 783 A.2d at 719.
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B. The Coleman Contemporaneous Consent Approach
Professor Carl Coleman rejects the idea of advance directives for the
disposal of surplus embryos, calling the process "dehumaniz[ing]."143 His
philosophy is summed up as follows:
The contractual approach to questions surrounding the disposi-
tion of frozen embryos embodies a conception of family rela-
tionships that society should be particularly reluctant to em-
brace. It is one thing for couples to assume the role of arms-
length negotiators when deciding about the division of property
in the event of a divorce. A couple beginning infertility treat-
ments, however, is embarking on the creation of a family. Deci-
sions about having children should be made in the spirit of trust
and mutual cooperation, not as part of a negotiated deal backed
by the force of law. Requiring partners to contract with each
other about their future reproductive plans dehumanizes [it] like
a business transaction rather than an expression of love. As Al-
exander Capron has argued, "[c]ontracts are a fine way to make
binding agreements about disposition of property, but they are
much less appropriate when deciding about personal relation-
ships, especially ones like joint parenthood that would be purely
hypothetical at the time a couple undergoing IVF would sign the
contract."'"
Professor Coleman's solution to the vexing problems that occur when
couples ultimately disagree about the use or destruction of their embryos is
what he terms a default position: the embryos would remain frozen until
the parties reach a mutual decision.'4 5 He maintains that parties cannot
predict with any certainty how they will feel once they have created em-
bryos.'4 6 Much of his argument on this point is an appeal to human expe-
rience and intuition.147 He suggests that a person who undergoes success-
ful IVF and has a genetic child may experience a parental feeling toward
the embryos despite an earlier decision to donate them or otherwise dis-
pose of them.'48 Under Professor Coleman's theory, the regretful gamete
donor could always change his mind.14
143. Coleman, supra note 99, at 106.
144. Id. (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, Parenthood and Frozen Embryos: More than Property and
Privacy, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Sep.-Oct. 1992, at 33).
145. Id. at 126.
146. Id. at 102.
147. Id. at 100-102.
148. Id. at 100-101.
149. Id at 126.
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If Professor Coleman's model were accepted, the courts would not
have had to decide the Kass or J.B. cases, or any other case. Whether par-
ties had a prior agreement would be irrelevant and the outcome certain: the
embryos would remain frozen. 5 o In Professor Coleman's reasoning, the
constitutional right of one party to procreate could never outweigh the
constitutional right of the other not to procreate and vice versa."' Such
cases would always end in a constitutional stalemate; therefore, cases in-
volving disputes over the disposition of embryos could only be solved by
continuing to freeze them.'52
Professor Coleman counters Professor Robertson's contention that
parties can best control their reproductive lives by making advance direc-
tives with his argument that contemporaneous mutual agreement theory
provides absolute certainty of the outcome and eliminates interference by
the courts.' Professor Coleman dispenses with Professor Robertson's re-
liance argument with the simple statement that no one could reasonably
rely on an advance directive under his theory. 15
Professor Coleman anticipated the contention that his theory is pater-
nalistic in so far as it denies consenting adults the right to contract in ad-
vance of IVF for the use or disposal of any frozen preembryos.' 5 He re-
sponds by arguing that paternalism works to protect parties from the
consequences of their actions and that society accepts limited paternalism
in a variety of contexts, including mandatory seatbelt laws and laws that
restrict use of non-tested drugs.'56 His greater point, however, is that his
theory is not paternalistic because it acts on behalf of a larger societal
cause; "promoting family relationships based on trust, or in the interest of
showing respect for the strength of genetic ties."'" Professor Coleman ba-
ses his public policy argument upon the theory that some rights are so
"central to identity" that they cannot be waived by advance directive.'
Professor Coleman cites two particularly striking examples in support of
his theory: contracts to marry and contracts to have an abortion, or to re-
150. Id.
151. Id. at 84-85.
152. Compare Coleman, supra note 99, at 84-85 (explaining that even if the partner who wishes to repro-
duce cannot do so by other means, appropriating the genetic material of someone who objects is not a con-
stitutional right), and Coleman, supra note 99, at 126 (noting that when no mutual decision can be made, all
genetic material should be frozen indefinitely).
153. Coleman, supra note 99, at 124-25.
154. Id. at 125.
155. Id. at 121.
156. Id. at 121-22.
157. Id at 121.
158. Id at 96.
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frain from having one.159 Coleman argues that these rights relate to "deep-
ly personal decisions that are central to most people's identity and sense of
self."6 0 Courts will not enforce a contract to marry if one party changes
his mind, and a court will not enforce a woman's promise to have an abor-
tion or refrain from having one if the woman changes her mind because of
the "pervasive, far-teaching, lifelong consequences."l6 Professor Cole-
man contends that a decision concerning disposition of surplus embryos
has consequences as pervasive and far-reaching as marriage or decisions
concerning abortion and, therefore, should enjoy the same constitutional
protections against improvident decisions.'62
While case law and anecdotal evidence support Professor Coleman's
belief that some people cannot envision the changes in their beliefs upon
undergoing IVF, others experience no such change.' They undergo suc-
cessful or unsuccessful IVF and feel no particular attachment to their re-
maining frozen embryos. The parties either agree to destroy the frozen
embryos, or they abandon them.
C. The Feminist Position
Professor Judith Daar contends that the female gamete donor should
hold the absolute right to implant or destroy any frozen embryos during
the same time frame that a pregnant woman would have an absolute right
over her fetus, citing Roe v. Wade and its progeny in support." Professor
Daar extrapolates from Roe v. Wade the proposition that a woman's right,
procreative autonomy, should be equally protected whether she conceives
by coitus or by IVF."' Professor Daar argues further that just as a man
loses his right not to procreate when coital conception occurs, he loses that
right as well when he voluntarily contributes sperm for in vitro fertiliza-
tion.' Other feminist commentators such as Ruth Colker point out that
the male gamete donor experiences no pain or risk of physical injury dur-
ing the IVF process while the female is vulnerable to both."' Both Profes-
159. Id. at 92-93.
160. Id. at 95.
161. Id at 92-93, 96 (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 739 (1989)).
162. Id. at 96-97.
163. By negative inference, while cases surrounding IVF disputes involve persons who have changed their
decisions that were stated in advanced directives, numerous couples do not change their decision recorded
in the advanced directives, and therefore have no reason to litigate.
164. Daar, supra note 73, at 466-67.
165. Id. at 466.
166. Id at 468.
167. Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063,
1075 (1996).
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sor Daar and Colker conclude that because of the unequal investment of
the male and female in the process, the courts should award frozen embry-
os to the female who seeks to use them to become a genetic parent. 168
Professor Daar recognizes, however, that the male donor in IVF pro-
cedures faces a possible consequence that men who engage in sexual inter-
course for procreation do not.' 9 If a man fathers a child by sexual inter-
course, his responsibility will attach within a relatively short period."' If a
man participates in IVF, he faces the possibility that the female gamete
donor will delay implanting the embryo for an unspecified period."' Thus,
the male donor who is no longer interested in procreating with the female
donor could remain in financial and emotional limbo indefinitely.'72 Pro-
fessor Daar solves the inequity by proposing that the female be allowed a
"medically reasonable" time in which to implant the embryos."' Professor
Daar suggests a forty-week period for implantation that would roughly ap-
proximate the natural gestation period. 4 If the first round of implantation
results in a pregnancy, she will exhaust the forty-week period and cannot
subsequently use any remaining embryos."' If the first attempt is not suc-
cessful and she is within the forty-week period, she can try again."' In any
event, the male gamete donor will know within forty weeks if a pregnancy
has begun."
Opponents of the feminist "sweat equity" position, argue that Roe v.
Wade and its progeny logically cannot be extended beyond actual preg-
nancy because the cases cite the physical autonomy and privacy of the
mother as the constitutionally protected interests, not her right to have a
genetic child by any means."' Since decisions involving frozen embryos
do not implicate the female's physical autonomy or her privacy interests,
opponents argue that the female is entitled to no greater consideration than
the male.'79 While this argument is beyond dispute as far as it goes, femi-
nist commentators argue that it misses the point. For feminists, the crucial
168. Daar, supra note 73, at 466-77; Colker, supra note 167, at 1075, 1079.
169. Daar, supra note 73, at 467.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 468.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes
over Dispositions ofFrozen Embryos?, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 1377, 1399-1402 (1995).
179. Id. at 1399-1401.
2013] 427
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.3:407
distinction is not between discrimination based upon gender; rather, they
argue that the law discriminates against women who must undergo IVF to
have a genetic child, while granting protected status to women who con-
ceive through intercourse.'
D. The Right to Procreate
In the 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska recognized the
"right of the individual to . . . marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren.""s' In 1942, the Court addressed the right to procreate apart from the
right to marry in Skinner v. Oklahoma.18 2 Skinner addressed the constitu-
tionality of an Oklahoma statute that allowed the sterilization of individu-
als convicted twice of crimes involving moral turpitude."' The Court
struck down Oklahoma's statute, declaring procreation to be "one of the
basic civil rights of man." 8 4
However, the 1980 decision in Harris v. McRae concluded that the
right to procreate is solely a negative one.' In the opinion set out in Har-
ris, the Court upheld the right to procreate as decided in Meyer and Skin-
ner, but held that a state has no affirmative duty to aid an individual in re-
alizing his procreative liberty.' In Harris, the Court drew a sharp
distinction between affirmative wrongful state action that interferes with
procreative liberty and any duty of the state to smooth an individual's path
to procreation.' For example, a state statute prohibiting an individual
from having more than two children would constitute an unconstitutional
interference with procreative liberty.' On the other hand, if an individual
can only conceive a child through IVF but has insufficient funds to obtain
the treatment, the state has no affirmative duty to provide the service."'
Thus, in private disputes between gamete donors regarding the implanta-
tion or destruction of their surplus preembryos, the state has played no part
in creating the obstacle to the procreative liberty.
180. Daar, supra note 73, at 465.
181. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
182. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
183. Id. at 536.
184. Id. at 541.
185. Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980).
186. Id. at 317-18.
187. Id. at 315-16.
188. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that decisions relating to procreation are
fundamental and thus subject to equal protection).
189. See JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 86-89 (1994) (citing examples of affirmative rights as
the state's duty to provide effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants and to provide pre-
termination hearings before terminating welfare benefits).
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Since constitutional case law provides no enhanced status to the party
in a divorce who wants to implant the frozen preembryos, the state is free
to engage its own discretion in creating statutory provisions to govern such
disputes. A state might statutorily create a preference for a solution that
allows for the preembryo to be implanted by one of the donors or donated
for implantation by an infertile couple. The state might also create a legal
preference for the party who opposes implantation - most courts have
adopted this option." 0
E. The Right Not to Procreate
The right not to procreate has been derived from case law involving
both contraception and abortion. The first of the contraception cases
reached the Supreme Court in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut."' The
Court reviewed Connecticut's statute that criminalized the act of dissemi-
nating information about contraceptives.'92 The Court concluded that the
statute invaded a zone of privacy within marriage that was "older than the
Bill of Rights" itself.'93 Since the purpose of obtaining and using contra-
ceptives is to avoid procreation, Griswold provided the beginning of an ar-
gument that at least married couples possess both a right to procreate and a
right not to procreate.
In 1972, the Supreme Court entertained arguments in Eisenstadt v.
Baird that unmarried individuals should also possess the privacy right to
use contraception and avoid procreation." 4 Having found a privacy right
in "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" seven years earlier,'95 the Court
concluded in Baird that all consenting adults possessed the same right to
avoid procreation.'96 To the consternation of many parents, the Court ex-
tended the right to obtain contraceptives to minors in the 1977 decision
Carey v. Population Services International.17
It is clear from the progression of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey
that the Court has found an incontrovertible right for any individual to
avoid procreation by the use of contraceptives." 8 Once conception has oc-
190. See e.g. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992)
191. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
192. Id. at 480.
193. Id. at 485-86.
194. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
195. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
196. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453.
197. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977).
198. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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curred, however, the right not to procreate is no longer universally guaran-
teed since the mother alone is thereafter vested with the right to decide
whether the pregnancy will go to term or be terminated.199
The abortion cases began in 1973 with the still controversial Supreme
Court decision in Roe v. Wade.200 For the first time, the Court found an
absolute right in the mother to terminate a pregnancy during the first tri-
mester.20' The Court found a right of privacy that was explained as fol-
lows:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice alto-
gether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnos-
able even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and contin-
uing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.202
The Court's language indicates three primary interests of women in
not procreating against their will.203 The first and arguably the most signif-
icant is a woman's interest in protecting her own health and bodily integri-
ty free of undue burdens by the state.204 Second, the Court cites a woman's
interest in the value of her reputation in her community, which in Roe v.
Wade stood to be damaged by an unwed pregnancy. 205 Third, the Court
recognized a woman's liberty interest in her own psychological wellbe-
ing.20 And fourth, the Court seemed to consider the detriment to other
199. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
200. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. Id. at 163.
202. Id at 153.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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family members, including the child, when a woman is forced to bear a
child against her will.207 In Roe v. Wade's progeny the Court reversed its
decision somewhat but only in so far as to change its trimester timeline.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court rejected the trimester scheme in Roe in favor of the moth-
er's absolute right to obtain an abortion before viability.208 Casey also ad-
dressed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's statute requiring a woman
to notify her husband of her intent to obtain an abortion.209 While ac
knowledging the father's "deep and proper concern and interest .. . in his
wife's pregnancy"2 10 as set out in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth,2 11 the Court held that such a notification statute impermissibly
invaded the mother's privacy. 212 When the husband and wife disagree
about the propriety of the wife having an abortion, the balance weighs in
favor of the wife since she is more directly affected by the decision. 213 The
import of Casey is unmistakable. The father does not share the mother's
constitutional right not to procreate after conception. 214 The father cannot
override the mother's right to abort, nor can he prevent her from taking the
pregnancy to term because he no longer wants to have a child with her.215
Whatever psychological or financial hardship the wife's decision may
cause the husband if she proceeds to carry the pregnancy to term is not
sufficiently weighty to permit the husband to thwart the mother's deci-
216sion.
One may reasonably argue, however, that decision-making regarding
the fate of a frozen embryo is distinguishable from those issues of mater-
nal privacy set out in Roe v. Wade. The difference in these cases is the
female gamete donor's bodily integrity is not implicated because she is not
pregnant. So long as the embryos remain frozen, there is no Roe v. Wade
mandate that would require deference to the preferences of the mother.
The male gamete donor's financial and emotional interests in not becom-
ing a father "can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection
that overrides the rights of the woman."2 17 The majority of courts have
207. Id.
208. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
209. Id. at 887.
210. Id. at 895 (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
211. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
212. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897-98.
213. Id. at 896-98.
214. Id at 898.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 870.
432 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.3:407
held that the right not to procreate will inevitably trump the other party's
right to procreate.
Professor Glenn Cohen argues that the right not to procreate is one
that can be "unbundled." 219 He breaks parenthood into three categories:
gestational parenthood, genetic parenthood and legal parenthood. 220 Gesta-
tional parenthood is unique to the female.221 Genetic parenthood, charac-
terized by the biological link between parent and child, is shared equally
by the male and female progenitors.222 Professor Cohen defines legal
parenthood in terms of legal responsibilities such as the duty to support
minor children.223
The right of the female gamete donor to refuse to implant an embryo
is absolute. A female's liberty interest in bodily integrity cannot be
abridged by forcing her to gestate her unwanted frozen embryos. Profes-
sor Cohen contends that the female's personal gestational right not to be-
come pregnant is the only constitutionally protected right not to procre-
ate.224 In Professor Cohen's view, her right not to become pregnant does
not equate with a right not to become a genetic parent against her will.225
To illustrate Professor Cohen's point, suppose that John and Mary have
undergone IVF and have three surplus frozen embryos. John remains ea-
ger for genetic parenthood and seeks legal control over the embryos so that
a surrogate can gestate them. Mary seeks legal control over the embryos
in order to destroy them. Professor Cohen's concept of parenthood would
allow for John to enjoy genetic and legal parenthood so long as Mary is
excused from the duties of legal parenthood.226 Under this scheme, Mary's
absolute right not to become a gestational parent against her will is vindi-
cated, while John's right to procreate is also vindicated.227 If the roles
were reversed, Mary could enjoy the opportunity for gestational, genetic
and legal parenthood.2 28 While John would become a genetic parent
against his will, he would not be a legal parent and would owe no duty to
the offspring.229
218. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 720 (N.J. 2001).
219. Cohen, supra note 70, at 1139-41.
220. Id at 1139.
221. Id.
222. See id at 1139-40.
223. Id. at 1140 n.7.
224. Id. at 1154.
225. Id. at 1148.
226. Id. at 1167.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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Professor Cohen gives short shrift to the notion that one's sensitivi-
ties against having a genetic child that one is not willing to parent is a suf-
ficiently important interest to invoke constitutional protection.230 Professor
Angela Upchurch also debunks the idea that unwanted genetic parenthood
is "a sufficiently compelling basis" on which to decide embryo disputes.23 1
She points out that if mere knowledge that one has a genetic child were
sufficiently important to influence the trajectory of one's life, there would
be no need for every state to have child support enforcement statutes.232
In his final analysis, Professor Cohen's theory centers on the question
of whether the right to not be a genetic parent can be waived.233 To sup-
port his argument that the right can be waived, Professor Cohen draws
similarities to waivable constitutional rights, including a criminal defend-
ant's right to a jury trial, and a civil party's right to settle rather than adju-
dicate a constitutional claim.234 He notes that if waivers are reviewed by a
court, the court should use the lower civil standard "where waiver is
'judged according to contract law principles."' 235
One may argue, as Professor Cohen suggests, 236 that mere participa-
tion in IVF is in fact a waiver of the right not to be a genetic parent. If a
court adopted that concept, there would be no need for a waiver agreement
signed by the parties. On the other hand, if a waiver agreement was re-
quired, then a document unlike the ones currently used by IVF clinicians
would need to be created.237
SECTION IV
NAHMANI: ISRAEL'S SOLUTION.3 .
After several years without children, Ruth and Daniel Nahmani de-
cided to undergo IVF.239 Because Ruth Nahmani was unable to carry a
child, the couple contracted with a surrogate in California to bear their
230. Id at 1165-66.
231. Upchurch, supra note 26, at 2145.
232. Id. at 2146.
233. Cohen, supra note 70, at 1185-86.
234. Id. at 1187.
235. Id at 1193-94 (quoting Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478, 512 (1981).
236. Id. at 1194.
237. See id at 1194-95.
238. CA 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani 50(4) IsrLR I [1996] (Isr.).
239. Id. at 1.
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child.240 After IVF, but before the surrogacy arrangement could be execut-
ed, Daniel Nahmani left his wife to live with another woman and fathered
a child in the new relationship.24' Although Ruth Nahmani refused to di-
vorce her husband, she wanted to go forward with the implantation of the
frozen embryos.24 2 Daniel no longer wanted to have a child with Ruth and
preferred that the embryos be destroyed.243 When Ruth sought release of
the embryos from the hospital and was refused, she filed suit.244 At the
time of the hearing, Ruth was no longer capable of producing ova, and im-
plantation of the embryos by a surrogate was Ruth's last chance to become
a genetic parent.245
The Nahmani case was the first of its kind to reach Israel's Supreme
Court.246 Israel had neither statutes nor case law to direct the Court in its
decision.247 In an eight-to-four split, the Court chose "a solution that is
consistent with both the law and the fundamental principles" of Israel's le-
gal system.248 The majority reached a decision it saw as being in con-
formity with "the values and norms" of Israeli society.249
The Court began its analysis with the right to procreate, stating:
It would appear that no one disputes the status and fundamental
importance of parenthood in the life of the individual and in so-
ciety. These have been basic principles of human culture
throughout history. Human society exists by virtue of procrea-
tion. Realizing the natural instinct to be fruitful and multiple is a
religious commandment of the Torah.250
The Court further mentioned the constitutional right of procreation
that exists in the United States. 251 The Court also took judicial notice of
American case law that has been construed to create a right not to procre-
ate.252 When faced with whether to vindicate Ruth's right to procreate or
Daniel's right not to become a genetic parent, the majority concluded that
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 8.
246. See id at 10.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1, 2-3, 8.
249. Id. at 8.
250. Id. at II (citation omitted).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 6.
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the contradictory concepts were not coextensive in Nahmani:
[T]he choice of parenthood is not just a decision concerning a
way of life; it has much greater significance for human exist-
ence. It expresses a basic existential need. Moreover, the deci-
sion to become a parent also has an element of self-realization,
particularly in modern society, which emphasizes self-
realization as a value. But the right to parenthood does not de-
rive only from self-realization. The right to life is an independ-
ent basic right, and it is not a derivative of the autonomy of the
will; the same is true of the right to parenthood. From this per-
spective, the symmetry created by the judgment between the
right to parenthood and a decision (legitimate, in itself) not to be
a parent (as an expression of personal freedom) is under-
mined.253
The Court then looked beyond its initial judgment of the asymmetry
of the respective right to procreate and the right not to procreate to seek
justice in the case at bar.254 The Court pointed out that Nahmani was not a
case of "forced parenthood" since before beginning IVF, Daniel had freely
given his consent to parenthood.255 In reliance upon Daniel's consent to
parenthood, Ruth underwent "complex, invasive and painful procedures in
order to extract the ova, in the knowledge that this was almost certainly
her last opportunity to bring a child of her own into the world."256 The
Nahmani Court resolved the dispute under estoppel theory.257 Daniel, hav-
ing induced detrimental loss to Ruth in the forms of monetary investment,
time, physical pain and risk, was held estopped from withdrawing his con-
sent to implanting the embryos.258 The Court also considered whether the
rule would apply equally when if it were the husband who wished to use a
surrogate to implant the embryos.259 The Court rejected arguments that the
wife should have exclusive control over the embryos during the period in
which she could lawfully obtain an abortion, concluding that the situations
were inapposite.260 The Court found that even though the wife made a
greater physical investment in the IVF procedure because of the pain and
253. Id at 40. (quoting Dr. D. Barak Erez, On Symmetry and Neutrality: Reflections on the Nahmani
Case, 20 TEL-Aviv UNI. L. REV. 197 (1996)).
254. Id. at 41 (citing Professor Barak, Judicial Legislation, 13 Mishpatim, 25, 71 (1983)).
255. Id. at 40.
256. Id. at 42.
257. Id. at 44-45.
258. Id. at 45.
259. Id. at 49.
260. Id. at 46-48.
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risk she undertook, the husband's reliance interest in having a child is co-
extensive with that of the wife's.26'
SECTION V
ANALYSIS: CONTRACT VS. CONTEMPORANEOUS
AGREEMENT MODELS
Professor Robertson's contract model is persuasive in that it validates
the right of consenting adults to secure future benefits by the execution of
prior agreements. The contract model also has the advantage of vindicat-
ing the reliance interests of both parties as they were stated prior to the
IVF procedure. Still, because the subject matter of such agreements is es-
pecially sensitive and the male and female are arguably in a confidential
relationship,262 the contract should be subject to some of the same safe-
guards that control in premarital agreements. The Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act ("UPAA") requires that premarital agreements be in writ-
ing and signed by both parties. 63 The same requirement should be im-
posed upon Pre-IVF agreements. Further, in order to assure that the par-
ties understand that they will be bound by their agreement in the event of
divorce or the death of a party, the Pre-IVF agreement should be a self-
contained document clearly denominated "Pre-IVF Agreement" and exe-
cuted solely between the male and female gamete donors. Enacting a Pre-
IVF statute governing such agreements would set forth a clear public poli-
cy in favor of pre-dispositional agreements and would serve to place par-
ties on notice of the effect of such agreements.
The UPAA does not specifically mandate that the parties consult with
an attorney with respect to the terms of the agreement;2" however, some
states have ruled that absence of independent counsel or the opportunity to
consult independent counsel can be construed as evidence of an agreement
that was entered into involuntarily.265 Imposing such a requirement in the
IVF context would ensure that parties have had an opportunity to make
careful, considered decisions before committing to a course of fertility
treatments.
When a fertility clinic requires that patients sign an informed consent
261. Id. at 48-50.
262. This would not be true if one party is using genetic material from an anonymous donor.
263. § 2. Formalities., Unif.Premarital Agreement Act § 2.
264. See id.
265. See e.g., In re Marriage of Hill and Dittmer, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Mamot
v. Mamot, 813 N.W.2d. 440,447 (Neb. 2012).
436
THE FROZEN EMBRYO
document, the document should be required to contain the following or
similar conspicuous language:
Your signature herein indicates only that you have been advised
of all known risks of the IVF procedure and have consented to
the procedure. Should you desire to decide in advance what
shall be done with any unused embryos in the event of a divorce
or upon the death of either of you, you should consult with an
attorney and have your agreement reduced to writing. Your
consent to the procedure does not constitute an agreement con-
cerning your interests in any frozen embryos in the event of a
divorce or the death of either party.
When parties execute a Pre-IVF agreement, the agreement should be
presumed valid, and the burden of proof should fall upon the party seeking
to invalidate the agreement. Again, by analogy to the UPAA, Pre-IVF
agreements should be subject to the following provisions:
(a) A Pre-IVF agreement is not enforceable if the party against
enforcement is sought proves that:
(1)That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2)The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed.2 6
The term "unconscionable" should be defined narrowly to mean the
agreement was obtained by duress or fraud. A party's emotional need to
have a genetic child, standing alone, would not constitute duress.
Professor Coleman's contemporaneous agreement theory is generous
in its attempts to allow for human frailty within the context of genetic rela-
tionships. Indeed, few adults can look back on all their decisions made
within the family without regret. Still, agreements between family mem-
bers should not be illegal simply because the potential for regret is great in
such circumstances.
Professor Coleman contends that one's ability to divorce indicates a
public policy in favor of not binding individuals to contracts that impinge
upon one's sense of selfhood.267 I disagree. States do not invalidate the
marriage contract by granting a divorce. The states grant divorce, not be-
cause the parties' marriage was void for impinging upon selfhood, but be-
266. See § 6. Enforcement., Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 6.
267. Coleman, supra note 99, at 95-96.
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cause it was a valid contract. Divorce is the remedy for breach of the mar-
riage contract. In the event of divorce, the state will enforce legally recog-
nized duties of post-marital spousal support and child support, despite the
changed feelings of the parties. If the parties had executed a premarital
agreement in accordance with state law, the state will enforce its terms in
spite of the regret that one party may experience.
I propose that any Pre-IVF contract should be presumed valid, sub-
ject to proof of fraud, duress, or unconscionable conduct. Thus, if the par-
ties agreed that their surplus embryos would be destroyed, the agreement
would be enforced as written. Employing the same reasoning, if the par-
ties agreed that one party should have exclusive control over the embryos,
the agreement should be enforced so long as the agreement conforms to
the Pre-IVF statute I proposed above. If the parties agreed that surplus
embryos should be donated for implantation by an infertile couple, the
states should vindicate that intention as well.
The next concern is the situation that confronts the courts when there
is no enforceable written agreement concerning the disposition of surplus
frozen embryos. Scholars have proposed four solutions to this issue that I
have set out above: to privilege the right to procreate; to privilege the right
not to procreate; to privilege the right of the female gamete donor to exclu-
sive rights over the frozen embryos as set out in Roe v. Wade and its prog-
eny; or to privilege the party who wants to procreate, if but only if, he or
she proves that implantation is his or her last realistic chance to have a ge-
netic offspring. (These bitter and heartbreaking choices are the very ones
that the courts could avoid if parties were both permitted and encouraged
to enter into considered agreement that would control in such situations.
Ironically, Professor Coleman's laudable desire to "humanize" the process
is best advanced by executing the very contracts he discourages).
I am inclined, largely in view of the persuasive force of Professor
Robertson's reliance theory and Professor Cohen's "unbundling" argu-
ment, to conclude that in the absence of an agreement, the best course is to
presume that the party who wants to use the genetic material for procrea-
tion should be preferred. I agree with Israel's Supreme Court majority
opinion that adopting a policy of privileging the party who wants to im-
plant the embryos does not force procreation upon anyone. Both parties
made an intentional, voluntary investment of time, genetic material, and
financial resources in their effort to have a biological child. I do not find it
credible that anyone would undertake such an intimate and heartfelt en-
deavor with the understanding that the other partner could unilaterally
change his or her mind after the fact and have the embryos destroyed at
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will. Furthermore, both parties relied upon the good faith of the other in
going forward with the conception process. I disagree with Professor Co-
hen, however, in so far as he seems to suggest that a genetic parent should
be excused from financial responsibility for a child he or she does not
want.
- The last issue I must address is what should be done with frozen em-
bryos that have been abandoned altogether. In this situation, I think only
two solutions are workable. In Model I, the IVF statute would provide that
the fertility clinic can dispose (destroy) of abandoned frozen embryos after
a statutorily set period. In Model II, the fertility clinic would be required
to notify a designated state agency that the embryos are available for adop-
tion. Either model would serve to relieve fertility clinics of any ongoing
responsibility for storing the abandoned genetic material.
Whether a state enacts Model I or Model II, the state should provide
the gamete donors with procedural safeguards similar to those afforded to
the parties in an adoption proceeding. In Model I states, the IVF statutes
would require the fertility clinic to send notice by certified mail to the
gamete donors' last known address(es) advising them of the entity's intent
to dispose of the embryos. The notice should advise the gamete donors of
the time, place, and method of disposal. In the event that there is no re-
sponse within thirty days, the statute would require notice by publication
of the proposed disposal of the embryos. Should the donors again fail to
respond, the statute would provide that the fertility clinic may then file a
verified petition for leave to destroy the embryos.
In Model II states, the process of giving notice to gamete donors
should parallel that required in adoption proceedings. If the donors do not
respond to notice, the statute should require that the fertility clinic provide
the designated state agency with the health histories of the gamete donors
and notice that the embryos are available for adoption. In fairness to the
fertility clinic, the IVF statute must provide that embryos not adopted
within a set period may be disposed of under the same procedure em-
ployed in Model I.
Model I has little to recommend itself except expediency. The state
treats the abandoned frozen embryo as mere property under the Model.
Model II, however, treats the frozen embryo as an entity "deserving of
special respect." The state provides a "life option" for the embryo and
provides infertile persons with an opportunity to have children. Critics of
Model II might argue that infertile individuals already have ample oppor-
tunities to adopt children, older children who may have physical or emo-
tional disabilities. I do not disagree with this contention; however, too
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many infertile couples either feel inadequate to the task or they simply do
not choose it. There is no compelling evidence to support the notion that
denying other means of adoption would foster additional adoptions of old-
er or impaired children.
CONCLUSION
As IVF becomes ever more popular, the need for clear embryo dispo-
sition procedures becomes even more necessary. By adopting clear meth-
ods of resolving disputes and handling abandoned embryos, both patients
and IVF professionals will be able navigate the TVF process with one less
burden.
